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I discuss a thesis that I call ‘The Appearance of Mind-Independence’, to the effect that, to 
the subject of an ordinary perceptual experience, it seems that the experience involves the 
awareness of a mind-independent world. Although this thesis appears to be very widely 
accepted, I argue that it is open to serious challenge. Whether such a challenge can be 
maintained is especially relevant to the assessment of any theory, such as Berkeley’s 
idealism, according to which the only objects of which we are aware in perception are 
mind-dependent. But the issue is of significance for the philosophy of perception more 
generally. In the course of my sceptical discussion, I argue that recent work by Campbell 
and Cassam [2014] may be flawed by a failure to take sufficiently seriously the 
requirements for genuine mind-independence. 
 
 







1. Introduction: Berkeley and common sense 
In taking physical objects to be mind-dependent collections of ideas, Berkeley appears to be 
in conflict with common-sense beliefs about the physical world. Moreover, in spite of his 
protestations to be a defender of common sense, Berkeley himself appears to admit that 
there is a conflict, notably in the following notorious passage: 
 
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, 
and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their 
being perceived by the understanding. [Principles 4] 
 
Although Berkeley claims that this belief can readily be seen to involve ‘a manifest 
contradiction’, he appears here to concede that it is prevalent among ordinary people, and 
not merely philosophers. According to a standard interpretation, Berkeley thought this 
conflict with common sense a price worth paying for the retention of another common-
sense belief: that in perception we are directly aware of physical objects [Tipton 1974: 54–
6; Foster and Robinson 1985: 3; Robinson 1996: xiii–xiv, 232].  
 What I want to consider is whether, in addition to being in conflict with our ordinary 
beliefs about the status of the physical objects that we perceive, Berkeley’s theory of 
physical objects as mind-dependent collections of ideas is also in conflict with our ordinary 
experience in perception. 
 I don’t aim to defend Berkeleian idealism. But this question is of interest, not simply for 
the assessment of Berkeley’s theory, but for the philosophy of perception more generally. 




discussing the relation between sensory experience and mind-independence: Campbell and 
Cassam’s Berkeley’s Puzzle [2014]. 
 
 
2. The thesis of the Appearance of Mind-Independence (AMI) 
Is it the case that, if Berkeleian idealism is true, our ordinary perceptual experience is 
misleading as to the character of the world we perceive – misleading because it presents, or 
seems to present, that world as mind-independent, when in fact it is not? This is what I take 
the question whether Berkeleian idealism is ‘in conflict’ with our ordinary experience in 
perception to be.1 
 This question can be subdivided. On the one hand, we can ask whether Berkeley’s 
theory is in conflict (in the sense indicated above) with what it is like for a subject to have 
an ordinary perceptual experience – what is sometimes called the experience’s 
‘phenomenology’, ‘phenomenal character’, or ‘conscious character’ [Siegel 2006b: 484, 
2016: section 1; Martin 1997: 93; Soteriou 2016: 222]. There is such a conflict if the 
following thesis is true: 
 
‘Phenomenal character’ version of the Appearance of Mind-Independence (AMI) thesis: 
Ordinary perceptual experience is (or involves) the presentation of objects and features 
as mind-independent.  
 
                                                          
1 Thus my topic is not whether Berkeleian idealism is inconsistent with the occurrence of ordinary 




On the other hand, we can ask whether Berkeley’s theory is in conflict (again in the sense 
indicated above) with the deliverances of introspection when we reflect upon the 
phenomenal character of our ordinary perceptual experience. There is such a conflict if the 
following thesis is true: 
 
‘Introspection’ version of the Appearance of Mind-Independence (AMI) thesis: Ordinary 
perceptual experience has the AMI (‘Appearance of Mind-Independence’) property: that 
is, it appears to its subject that the experience is (or involves) the awareness of mind-
independent objects and features.2 
 
 The two versions of the AMI thesis are subtly different. Roughly, the first is a claim 
about how the world seems to us when we have a perceptual experience (that it seems to be 
a mind-independent world), whereas the second is a claim about how the experience seems 
to us when we reflect upon it (that it seems to be of a mind-independent world). 
 I return to the issue of the relation between the theses shortly (section 2.2). Meanwhile, I 
want to emphasize that, in either of these versions, the AMI thesis is a claim about how 
things appear to the perceiver to be; not a claim about what the objects (if any) of which the 
perceiver is aware actually are. Hence the AMI thesis (in either version) could be true even 
if, as Berkeley maintains, we never perceive any mind-independent objects. According to 
the Berkeleian, if the AMI theses were true, our perceptual experience would be misleading 
                                                          
2 This is to be read as implying that it appears to the subject that the experience presents the objects 




as to the true nature of perception. But that does not entail that there is any inconsistency 
between the Berkeleian theory and the AMI theses.3 
 It appears to be widely believed that the AMI thesis, in one or other (or both) of the 
versions that I have distinguished, is true. Or at least, it appears to be widely believed that 
some such version of the AMI thesis is widely believed. 
 For example, it seems to be the AMI thesis, in its ‘phenomenal character’ version, that 
Tim Crane and Craig French attribute to ‘our ordinary conception of perceptual experience’ 
when they endorse the following thesis: 
 
Mind-Independence: perceptual experience involves the presentation (as) of ordinary 
mind-independent objects [2017: section 1.1.1], 
 
which they also express as the claim that ‘perceptual experience is a presentation of, or is as 
of, a public, mind-independent subject-matter’ [ibid.; italics omitted]. The qualification in 
the phrase ‘presentation (as) of’ is explained by Crane and French as allowing that a 
perceptual experience can satisfy (and not merely appear to satisfy) their Mind-
Independence thesis even if it is a pure hallucination [ibid.: section 1.1.2, final paragraph]. 
 Matthew Nudds seems to take it for granted that the ‘introspection’ version of the AMI 
thesis is true, at least for visual perception: 
 
In general . . . when we introspect a visual experiential episode, it seems that we are 
related to some mind-independent object or feature that is present and is a part, or a 
constituent, of the experience. [2009: 334. Italics mine] 
                                                          





Nudds adds that it is ‘widely accepted that visual experiences seem to have’ ‘the property of 
having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ [ibid.: 334–5. Italics 
mine]. 
 Further examples are not hard to find. According to Katalin Farkas, it ‘is an integral part 
of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an 
experience-independent world’ [2013: Abstract]. John Campbell appears to take it for 
granted that ordinary perceptual experience satisfies a version of the AMI thesis; for 
example, in saying: ‘ordinary perceptual experience seems to provide us at every moment 
with crowds of mind-independent things’ [Campbell and Cassam 2014: 29]. In the same 
work, Quassim Cassam is hospitable to the idea that ‘the mind-independence of objects 
actually shows up in sensory experience’ [ibid.: 165]. And Michael Martin speaks of ‘the 
fact that our experience does manifestly present a mind-independent world’ [2006: 406].  
 Widely accepted or not, however, we may question whether the AMI theses do 
accurately describe the phenomenology that our ordinary perceptual experiences have, or 
seem to us to have. And this is just what I shall question. Before proceeding, however, I 
must say more about the two versions of the AMI thesis, and a complication concerning 
Naïve Realism and phenomenal character. 
 
2.1 Naïve Realism, phenomenal character, and Berkeleian idealism 
According to some proponents of Naïve Realism, the phenomenal character of a veridical 
perceptual experience is constituted, in part, by (relations to) mind-independent objects and 
features.4 (See, for example, Nudds [2009: 335]; Soteriou [2016: 65–6, 161]; cf. Martin 
                                                          




[2002: 394–5].)  On this view, it would not be possible to have an experience with that 
phenomenal character if Berkeleian idealism were true. These theorists are therefore 
committed to the thesis that the very occurrence of perceptual experiences with that 
phenomenal character is inconsistent with Berkeleian idealism.  
 I cannot, in this paper, attempt a refutation of this version of Naïve Realism on 
Berkeley’s behalf. However, I want to emphasize that this form of Naïve Realism does not 
entail the ‘phenomenal character’ version of the AMI thesis. Even if ordinary (veridical) 
perceptual experiences do have a phenomenal character that is (partly) constituted by 
(relations to) mind-independent objects and features, it does not follow that the phenomenal 
character of these experiences involves the presentation of these (mind-independent) objects 
and features as mind-independent. Thus, those who hold this form of Naïve Realism are not 
thereby entitled to claim that the feature of mind-independence is part of (or a constituent 
of) the phenomenal character of even our veridical perceptual experiences.5  
 
2.2 Phenomenal character and introspection 
In giving two versions of the AMI thesis, I have attempted to accommodate a distinction 
between the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience, and the phenomenal 
character that the experience appears to its subject to have when the subject reflects on the 
experience.  
 According to many writers, a perceptual experience may possess a phenomenal 
character (there may be something it is like to have the experience) even if the subject does 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
veridical perceptual experience is essentially a relation to mind-independent objects and features, 
and is associated with a disjunctivist theory of perception. 




not introspectively reflect on what that phenomenal character is. This provides one reason 
for distinguishing my two versions of the AMI thesis. 
 A further reason is that some proponents of Naïve Realism hold that the phenomenal 
character of a perceptual experience can be other than it appears to introspection to be. 
According to these theorists, a pure hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from 
a veridical perception appears to have a phenomenal character (that of a veridical 
perception) that it does not actually have. (See, for example, Nudds [2009: 335]; Soteriou 
[2016: chs 3 and 6].) 
 From now on, however, I shall generally ignore these complications, and focus on the 
‘introspection’ version of the thesis. I shall take the AMI thesis to be the following: 
 
The Appearance of Mind-Independence (AMI) thesis: Ordinary perceptual experience has 
the AMI (‘Appearance of Mind-Independence’) property: that is, it appears to its subject 
that the experience is (or involves) the awareness of mind-independent objects and 
features. 6, 7 
 
My principal justification (apart from limitations of space) is that those who hold the 
‘phenomenal character’ version of the AMI thesis typically appeal to the ‘introspection’ 
                                                          
6 See note 2 above. 
7 Following many other writers, I use the expression ‘ordinary perceptual experience’ without 
defining it. I take it, though, that ‘extraordinary’ perceptual experiences would include cases in 
which it seems to its subject that the experience is an awareness only of figments of the subject’s 
own mind or perceptual apparatus. I also assume that the topic is the ordinary perceptual experience 




version as evidence for the phenomenal character version (for example, Crane and French 
[2017]).8  
 Now that it is clear what the Appearance of Mind-Independence (AMI) thesis that is my 
target asserts, we can proceed to consider whether the thesis is true. In order to do so, 
though, we need to know what the alternatives to the AMI thesis are. I approach this issue 
by considering what Berkeley’s attitude to the thesis should be. 
 
 
3. The options for Berkeley 
Option 1: Error theory 
As already indicated (section 2 above), one option for a Berkeleian idealist appears to be to 
accept the AMI thesis, and concede that it seems to us that in perception we are confronted 
with mind-independent physical objects, although in fact we never are. If Berkeley were to 
take this option, he would have to present his theory of perception as an error theory. 
 However, this error theory comes at a price. I do not have space to do justice to the 
relevant issues here. Most crucially, though, adopting this option would require Berkeley to 
relinquish one of his most cherished doctrines: that the way the world really is in itself is, 
broadly speaking, the way it appears to us in perception, and that in this respect his theory is 
in accord with common sense.9 
                                                          
8 This is true even of those Naïve Realists mentioned above who think that introspection is not an 
infallible guide to phenomenal character [Nudds 2009: 335]. 
9 Some may suppose that the error theory is not available to Berkeley, even as an inferior option, on 
the grounds that Berkeley denies that we even have the concept of a mind-independent physical 





Option 2: reject the AMI thesis in favour of a thesis of the Appearance of Mind-
Dependence (AMD) 
A radical response on Berkeley’s part would be to deny the AMI thesis, and assert, in its 
place, the following: 
 
The AMD thesis: Ordinary perceptual experience has the AMD (‘Appearance of Mind-
Dependence’) property: that is, it appears to its subject that the experience is (or 
involves) the awareness only of mind-dependent objects and features. 
 
However, although Berkeley himself might have been tempted by this option,10 I think it is 
very unattractive. It seems completely implausible to claim that a faithful description of the 
phenomenology of a typical perceptual experience – for example, that of viewing a 
landscape – would say that it appears to be an awareness only of things that are dependent 
on some mind for their existence. Rather than adopting this radical response, Berkeley 
would, I suggest, be better off taking a third way.  
 
Option 3: reject the AMI thesis in favour of Neutrality 
According to this third option, although our ordinary perceptual experience does seem to us 
(when we introspectively reflect upon it) to be or to involve the awareness of physical 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
unequivocally denies that we have the concept of a mind-independent physical object, as opposed to 
denying that we have a coherent concept of such an object. 




objects and features, it does not seem to be or involve the awareness of them as mind-
independent or as mind-dependent. This can be encapsulated in the following thesis: 
 
The Neutrality thesis: Ordinary perceptual experience has the Neutrality property: that is, 
it appears to its subject that the experience is (or involves) the awareness of physical 
objects and features, but it is not the case that it appears to its subject that the experience 
is (or involves) the awareness of those physical objects and features as mind-independent 
or as mind-dependent.  
 
If the Neutrality thesis is correct, then both the AMI thesis and the AMD thesis are 
incorrect. 
 Once the Neutrality thesis is on the table, however, I think this poses a significant 
challenge to the AMI thesis. Not only does the Neutrality thesis represent (I think) the best 
option for Berkeley; in addition, it is, I shall maintain, a serious rival to the AMI thesis, 
independently of the debate between Berkeley and his opponents. 
 So my next question is: how might one defend the AMI thesis – the thesis that an 
ordinary perceptual experience seems to its subject to involve the awareness of a mind-
independent world – against the rival Neutrality thesis? In the next section, I consider three 
inadequate reasons for accepting the AMI thesis. The reason for this indirect approach is 
that, by considering these failures, it will become evident just how difficult is the task of 







4. Three inadequate reasons for accepting the AMI thesis 
4.1 Physical object concepts in introspective reports 
In a famous discussion of perceptual experience, P. F. Strawson observed that, if asked to 
report one’s visual experience in a way that is faithful to the nature of the experience, one 
will describe it, not in terms of shapes or coloured patterns, but using terms that refer to 
ordinary physical objects, such as this: 
 
‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered 
branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass . . 
.’ [1979: 43] 
 
Moreover (Strawson continues), even if asked to report one’s experience in a way that 
(unlike the description just given) involves no commitment to the experience’s being 
veridical – a report that would remain faithful to the nature of the experience even if it 
should turn out to be an illusion – one would still use a description in terms of sun, elms, 
deer, etc., but amend it to ‘protect it’ against falsification, by saying something like: ‘“I had 
a visual experience such as it would have been natural to describe by saying that I saw [the 
red light of the setting sun . . .], etc. . . .”’ [ibid.: 43–4. Italics mine]. 
 Strawson concludes that in addition to the fact that ‘[o]ur perceptual judgements . . . 
embody or reflect a certain view of the world, as containing objects, variously propertied, 
located in a common space and continuing in their existence independently of our 
interrupted and relatively fleeting perceptions of them’, ‘it [now] appears . . . that our 




figure in such judgements’ [ibid.: 44. Italics mine]. On this basis Strawson asserts what we 
can call his ‘permeation thesis’: 
 
Sensible experience is permeated by concepts of . . . realistically conceived objects. 
[ibid.: 45] 
 
 Strawson’s discussion is often cited in support of the thesis that ordinary perceptual 
experience involves at least the appearance of an awareness of mind-independent objects – 
that is, in support of the AMI thesis.11 But it should be obvious that, if transported to a 
dialectical situation in which the opponent of the AMI thesis is a Berkeleian idealist, what 
Strawson says here is entirely inadequate as an argument for the thesis. Strawson simply 
assumes that the physical object concepts that he takes to ‘permeate’ our perceptual 
experience are concepts of physical objects ‘realistically construed’ – construed in a way 
that entails that they are mind-independent items, rather than, say, collections of ideas. 
Hence it is open to the Berkeleian to agree with Strawson that a faithful description of one’s 
perceptual experience must employ physical object concepts – must describe it as an 
experience as of such things as the sun, elms, deer, etc. – while also denying that this 
faithful description requires a realistic construal of those physical object concepts.  
 That is not yet to say that Strawson is wrong in thinking that a faithful description of 
how a typical visual experience seems to its subject must involve concepts of physical 
objects construed ‘realistically’, as the AMI thesis implies. My point is just that Strawson 
provides no argument for this. 
                                                          




 Let us compare two versions of a ‘permeation thesis’: the Strawsonian version, 
according to which our sensible experience is permeated by concepts of mind-independent 
physical objects, and a ‘neutral’ version according to which it is permeated by concepts of 
physical objects that involve no commitment to the status of those physical objects as mind-
independent or mind-dependent.12 I suspect that many who claim to find Strawson’s 
observations compelling have failed to distinguish these, and to consider the possibility of 
the neutral version. But unless they are distinguished, it is illegitimate to appeal to 
Strawson’s discussion in support of the AMI thesis rather than the Neutrality thesis that is 
its rival. 
 Suppose, though, that, once the distinction is appreciated, there are those who insist that 
however it may be with others, their introspection does support the Strawsonian version of 
the permeation thesis, rather than its neutral rival?13 There is not much that I can say to 
counter such a sincere insistence. But I think it is questionable whether these people would 
be correctly describing – and not ‘over-interpreting’ – the deliverances of introspection. 
More significantly, though, since the AMI thesis is supposed to be a general thesis about 
ordinary (mature) perceptual experience, if the Strawsonian thesis were true only of some 
typical mature human perceivers, but not of other such perceivers, this would seriously 
weaken the force of these introspective arguments in favour of the AMI thesis.14 
                                                          
12 These concepts would themselves be ‘neutral’ in the sense that they would apply to physical 
objects regardless of whether physical objects (trees, tables, etc.) are mind-independent or mind-
dependent. This does not imply, however, that to possess such a ‘neutral’ concept one must have an 
appreciation of its ontological neutrality. 
13 Thanks to Craig French for raising this issue. 
14 It would also contradict Strawson’s claim that his permeation thesis is true of ‘the character of 




 Finally, we can consider the implications of Strawson’s account for the case of an 
otherwise ordinary perceiver who is a convinced Berkeleian idealist. Would Strawson claim 
that his permeation thesis is true even of this Berkeleian perceiver – that in spite of the 
Berkeleian’s convictions, his sensible experience is permeated by the very concepts of 
physical objects that he rejects? Or would Strawson claim, instead, that the Berkeleian’s 
sensible experience is permeated by concepts of physical objects not realistically conceived, 
and thus differs significantly from that of the ordinary person (cf. Ayer [1979: 292])? 
Neither option seems very appealing. To the extent that they are not, this threatens the 
credibility of the Strawsonian permeation thesis. 
 
4.2 The ‘argument from associated belief’ 
As I have noted (section 1), Berkeley sometimes appears to concede that ordinary people 
believe that when they perceive a physical object they perceive something mind-
independent (although he thinks that this belief is mistaken, and involves a contradiction). 
Take, then, someone who does hold this ‘strangely prevailing’ opinion about the nature of 
physical objects. Could such a person argue as follows? 
 
(1) I am having a perceptual experience in which it seems to me that I am aware of a 
tree. 
(2) I believe that trees are mind-independent objects. 
Therefore: 






If this argument were sound, it would appear to establish that, at least for someone who 
believes in the mind-independence of physical objects, that person’s perceptual experience 
would satisfy the AMI thesis.  
 Unfortunately for the defender of the AMI thesis, however, the argument is invalid if its 
conclusion is interpreted in a way that would support the AMI thesis. It doesn’t follow, 
from the fact that one has a perceptual experience that appears to be an awareness of an 
object, plus the fact that one believes that that object has a certain property, that one’s 
perceptual experience appears to be an awareness of the object’s having that property (or of 
the object as having that property). For example, if I have a visual experience that appears 
to be of a cat in the garden, and I believe that the cat is five years old, it does not follow that 
I have a visual experience that appears to be an awareness of the cat as having the property 
of being five years old.  
 But the AMI thesis under discussion here is not the thesis that one’s perceptual 
experience seems to be an awareness of objects of which one also happens to believe that 
they are mind-independent. It is the thesis that it seems to be an awareness of them as mind-
independent. The mind-independence has to be something of which one is, or at least 
appears to be, perceptually aware. (See section 2 above.) And (as the example of the cat 
shows) this is not guaranteed simply by one’s possession of the belief that the object of 
which one appears to be perceptually aware has that property. 
 I shall return to this point in section 6. For the present, it is enough to note that the 
argument considered above – what we might call ‘the argument from associated belief’ – is 






4.3 ‘Particular mind-independence’ 
It is sometimes said that ordinary perceptual experience presents its objects as not 
depending for their existence on that particular perceptual episode, or as not depending for 
their existence on the perceiver who has the experience. (See, for example, Siegel [2006a: 
356–7].) If this is true, it is certainly an important fact. But even if it could be established 
that ordinary perceptual experience has this feature, it would be a gross non sequitur to 
conclude, without further argument, that it has the AMI feature that is under discussion in 
this paper. 
 It hardly needs saying that neither the property of being independent of a particular 
perceptual episode nor the property of being independent of a particular perceiver is the 
same as the property of being independent of all perceptual episodes and all minds and 
perceivers. Let us call the first of these ‘particular mind-independence’, and the latter 
‘absolute mind-independence’.15  
 In suggesting (sections 2 and 3 above) that the AMI thesis appears to be in tension with 
Berkeleian idealism, I have, of course, assumed that the notion of mind-independence 
involved in the AMI thesis is that of absolute mind-independence.16 As is well known, 
Berkeley accepts that the physical objects that I perceive do not depend for their existence 
on my mind, or my current awareness of them. For example, the table that I now perceive 
could exist without my perceiving it, as long as some other mind perceives it [Principles 3]. 
                                                          
15 An anonymous referee has asked whether I assume that an object or feature is ‘absolutely’ mind-
independent just in case it would figure in Williams’s [1978] ‘absolute conception’ of the world. I 
make no such assumption, but shall not discuss the issue further here. 
16 By ‘in tension with’, of course I don’t mean ‘incompatible with’, since there is the ‘error theory’ 




Hence the following modified version of the AMI thesis is not in any tension with 
Berkeleian idealism: 
 
APMI (Appearance of Particular Mind-Independence) thesis: Ordinary perceptual 
experience has the APMI (‘Appearance of Particular Mind-Independence’) property: that 
is, it appears to its subject that the experience is (or involves) an awareness of objects 
and features that do not depend for their existence on that experience or on its subject.  
 
In other words, the APMI thesis, unlike the AMI thesis, does not imply that if Berkeleian 
idealism is true, introspection of our ordinary perceptual experience is systematically 
misleading as to the status of the objects that we perceive.17 For, according to Berkeley, 
ordinary perceptual experience really is typically an awareness of physical objects and 
features (such as trees and their properties) that could and do exist independently of our 
individual perception of them. What Berkeley denies, of course, is that these physical 
objects and features could exist independently of all minds and perceivers. Hence, unless 
supplemented with an argument for the conclusion that if perceptual experience has the 
APMI property, it must also have the AMI property, the appeal to the fact (if it is a fact) that 
ordinary perceptual experience has the APMI property is worthless as a reason for accepting 
the AMI thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
17 This is not to say that Berkeley is committed to the APMI thesis. He could consistently hold that 
ordinary perceptual experience, as we introspect it, is neutral as to whether its objects have the 




4.3.1 Ignoring the distinction between absolute and particular mind-independence 
Oddly enough, a failure consistently to observe the distinction between particular and 
absolute mind-independence is a feature of the discussion by Campbell and Cassam in their 
recent Berkeley’s Puzzle [2014]. Oddly, because the book purports to be a discussion of the 
concept of a mind-independent physical object that Berkeley regards as incoherent. 
 Campbell and Cassam agree that Berkeley holds that we do not (and could not) have a 
(coherent) concept of a mind-independent physical object.18 Campbell and Cassam think 
that we do have this concept, and seek to explain how our possession of it is possible. And 
they undertake the further task of explaining how our possession of this concept is or could 
be grounded in our perceptual (sensory) experience.19  
 But now, the concept of mind-independence that Berkeley judges to be incoherent as 
applied to physical objects is, as we know, that of absolute mind-independence. One would 
therefore expect that the concept for which Campbell and Cassam seek a grounding in 
sensory experience is that of an absolutely mind-independent physical object. Yet both 
authors sometimes seem to lose sight of this, and use ‘mind-independence’ as a label for 
what I have called ‘particular mind-independence’. Thus Campbell says: 
 
For each of us, the visual experience in this case of joint attention . . . has to be 
characterized in terms of the object itself that both you and I are experiencing. It’s 
implicit here that the object in question is mind-independent. It can’t be internal to your 
                                                          
18 Campbell and Cassam omit the qualification ‘coherent’. But see note 9 above. 
19  This is an additional task, because one might hold that the concept of a mind-independent 
physical object is a ‘theoretical’ concept that is not grounded in our sensory experience in the 




mind, because it’s what I am attending to. And it can’t be internal to my mind, because 
it’s what you are attending to. [Campbell and Cassam 2014: 68. Italics mine] 
 
It does not follow, from the fact that the object is not dependent on the minds of either of 
two perceivers taken individually, that it is independent of the minds of all perceivers taken 
collectively. So if Campbell’s argument here is to be cogent, ‘mind-independent’ must be 
taken in its ‘particular mind-independence’ sense, not its ‘absolute mind-independence’ 
sense. 
 As for Cassam, in the following passage he explicitly identifies mind-independence with 
what I have called ‘particular mind-independence’: 
 
a natural question is: does my [current visual] experience [of the tree] represent the tree 
as mind-independent? Many representationalists would say that it does. According to 
Susanna Siegel, for example, ‘the objects we seem to see are presented to us as subject-
independent’ . . . What Siegel calls subject-independence is what I call mind-
independence; it is ‘the independence of a thing’s existence from the experience that the 
subject has in seeing it . . .’ [ibid.: 161, quoting Siegel [2006a]. Some italics added] 
 
But Cassam has surely slipped up in making the claim that I have emphasized in the last 
sentence of this quotation. Contrary to what he says here, subject-independence (a form of 
particular mind-independence) is not what he means by the term ‘mind-independence’ in 




 Elsewhere in the book Campbell and Cassam show that they are aware that it is absolute 
mind-independence that is relevant to their anti-Berkeleian project.20 So the passages I have 
quoted appear to be aberrations. Nevertheless, perhaps the fact that these passages occur at 
all in their book is a symptom of how easy it is to forget that particular mind-independence 
does not amount to absolute mind-independence. 
 
4.3.2 From particular mind-independence to absolute mind-independence? 
The preceding discussion obviously raises the question whether a bridge could be built that 
would allow one to move from the APMI thesis to the AMI thesis, where the latter is 
understood as a thesis about absolute mind-independence.  
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this possibility. However, this project 
appears to be a formidable research programme, and one that, as far as I am aware, no one 
has successfully executed.21 Thus the credentials of the APMI thesis as a potential basis for 
the AMI thesis are, to say the least, unproven.  
 
 
5. Taking stock 
One possible reaction to my discussion so far is this. It might be suggested that many of 
those whom I take to have claimed (or to have claimed that others claim) that the AMI 
                                                          
20 See, for example, Campbell [ibid.: 28, 32, 97, 181]; Cassam [ibid.: 128, 150–1].  
21 It would be instructive to compare this project with an attempt, in meta-ethics, to build a bridge 
between (a) the thesis that moral facts are independent of the moral sensibility of any particular 
individual and (b) the thesis that moral facts are independent of the moral sensibilities of all human 





thesis is true have simply been imprecise in expressing their views. Perhaps many of them 
have been using ‘mind-independent objects’ to mean ‘ordinary physical objects’, without 
considering a Berkeleian interpretation of ‘ordinary physical object’. Perhaps some of them 
intended nothing stronger than that it seems to us that the objects we perceive have the 
property of particular (as opposed to absolute) mind-independence. 
 Even if this were the most that my negative arguments have revealed, this would be a 
significant result. It is an important philosophical question whether our perceptual 
experience really does seem to us to involve a mind-independent world, in the ‘absolute’ 
sense of that expression. And making progress with answering this question requires that we 
distinguish it from others with which it might be conflated.  
 I take it, though, that at least some who have endorsed what appear to be versions of the 
AMI thesis really do intend to advocate it in its strict, literal, and absolute sense. In the 




6. How plausible is the AMI thesis, anyway? 
My first comment is that the AMI thesis, so understood, actually seems to me extremely 
implausible. Given the points noted in section 4.2 above, there is a puzzle about how mind-
independence could figure in our perceptual experience in a way that the thesis suggests. 
The AMI thesis seems to require that the property of mind-independence (in its ‘absolute’ 
sense) be a property of which it appears to us that we are perceptually aware. But how could 




 A straightforward suggestion would be that mind-independence figures in our awareness 
as a perceptible property. But this seems crazy. The property of mind-independence (in the 
absolute sense) is that of being capable of existing unperceived or unthought of (being 
capable of extra-mental existence). And I don’t see how it could be right to say that, in 
being (apparently) perceptually aware of a tree – say, in a visual experience – I am 
(apparently) perceptually aware of its mind-independence. Do trees look mind-independent? 
Does it even make sense to suggest that they do?  
 My problem is not that (absolute) mind-independence is a modal property. I do not find 
problematic the suggestion that something can look dangerous, or fragile, for example, 
although these are modal properties. Nevertheless, it is implausible to suppose that all 
modal properties are genuinely perceptible.22 So in claiming that (absolute) mind-
independence is not a perceptible property, I am not pleading for an exception to an 
otherwise universal rule.  
 On the other hand, if the AMI thesis is not claiming that mind-independence, as such, 
seems to be a perceptible feature of the objects that we seem to perceive, what exactly is it 
saying? How does it differ from the thesis that when we have a perceptual experience, we 
have the associated belief that the objects of which we appear to be aware are mind-
independent? (Cf. section 4.2 above.) 
 Perhaps the answer is this: although mind-independence is not itself a perceptible 
property, there is some other perceptible property, or set of properties, that we appear to be 
aware of in perceptual experience, and it is in virtue of this that it is appropriate (even if, 
                                                          
22 The issue of which properties are genuinely perceptible cannot be examined in detail here. For 




perhaps, a bit misleading) to describe our perceptual experience as appearing to us to be the 
awareness of mind-independent objects. 
 The next question, obviously, is twofold. Are there such properties? And, if so, what are 
they? This is a huge issue, and I cannot hope to resolve it here. But I shall conclude this 
paper with a (sceptical) consideration of some candidates for this role suggested by 
Campbell and Cassam in their recent joint work [2014].  
 
 
7. Perceptual experience and absolute mind-independence 
Campbell and Cassam [2014] are not primarily concerned to defend the version of the AMI 
thesis that has been the focus of my discussion in this paper – its ‘introspection’ version (cf. 
section 2.2 above). I take it, though, that both of them aim to defend the ‘phenomenal 
character’ version of the AMI thesis that I distinguished in section 2. For they seek to 
ground our conception of a mind-independent physical object in our sensory experience, by 
attempting to identify features of that experience that present, or represent, the mind-
independence of the physical objects that we perceive.23 Moreover, as I have emphasized 
(section 4.3.1), their anti-Berkeleian project makes sense only on the assumption that the 
relevant notion of mind-independence is the absolute one. Their project is thus relevant to 
the defence of the ‘introspection’ version of the AMI thesis that is the focus of my 
discussion. For if there are features of the phenomenal character of our perceptual 
experience that genuinely ground a conception of absolute mind-independence, then it is 
                                                          
23 Cassam expresses reservations about the project, because he is not convinced of the 
‘experientialist’ assumption on which it relies [ibid: 116, 124–35]. In most of the work, though, he 




reasonable to suppose that, in introspectively reflecting on that phenomenal character, it 
would seem to us that we are aware of a mind-independent (in the sense of ‘absolutely 
mind-independent’) world. 
 I cannot attempt here to do justice to their extensive and sophisticated discussion. 
However, I think that there are serious problems about whether the candidates that 
Campbell and Cassam propose for the ‘mind-independence’ role can do the job required of 
them. 
 Both Campbell and Cassam argue that mind-independence does ‘show up’ in our 
perceptual experience, although they have very different theories of how this is possible. 
According to Campbell, the key to the mind-independence of physical objects is a kind of 
causal autonomy (or ‘causal unity’) – their possession of an ‘immanent causal structure’ 
that constitutes their identity [2014: 97]. For example: 
 
[It is] central to our conception of [physical] objects as mind-independent . . . [that we] 
think of [them] as internally causally connected: the way an object is later depends not 
only on how other things impinge on it, but on the way the object itself was earlier. And . 
. . this internal causal connectedness of the object, which is independent of its relation to 
a mind, is what constitutes the identity of the object . . . [ibid.: 26. Italics mine]  
 
According to Campbell’s ‘relational’ conception of perceptual experience, the mind-
independence reveals itself in perceptual experiences in virtue of those experiences’ having 
(in favourable cases) a nature that is in part constituted by relations to the mind-independent 





 According to Cassam, the key to the mind-independence of physical objects is that they 
are constant, persisting, and material. According to his ‘representationalist’ conception of 
perceptual experience, the mind-independence of physical objects ‘shows up’  in perceptual 
experiences which ‘display’ it [ibid.: 165] because those experiences represent the objects 
as mind-independent ‘by representing them as constant, persisting, and material’ [ibid: 164]. 
Moreover, Cassam implies that it is sufficient, for an experience to represent an object as 
material, that it represent it as having primary qualities: ‘My sensory experience represents 
the tree as shaped, located, and solid, and thereby represents it as a material object’ [ibid.: 
163].  
 Although Campbell and Cassam may regard these properties as actually constituting 
mind-independence, I shall describe them as ‘surrogates for mind-independence’. This 
allows me to ask two questions: (1) Do the properties invoked by Campbell and Cassam as 
surrogates for mind-independence really show up in our perceptual experience in the 
relevant way? (2) Are these properties really fit to play the surrogacy role? 
 I think that there are difficulties about whether even the first requirement is met. 
However, I shall focus on the second. 
 If the properties in question are to be suitable surrogates for the property of mind-
independence, they had better be sufficient for mind-independence. They had better be 
properties that physical objects would not have unless they were mind-independent. Once 
this requirement is made explicit, though, I think it reveals a severe difficulty for 
Campbell’s and Cassam’s accounts, given that what is at issue is the absolute mind-
independence that Berkeley denies to physical objects. 
 What properties would physical objects have if Berkeleian idealism were true – that is, 




not only by the perceptual experience of humans (and other finite minds), but also 
ultimately by the mind of God? Crucially, would such Berkeleian physical objects lack any 
of the properties that Campbell and Cassam treat as surrogates for mind-independence? 
 With regard to Campbell’s account, I concede that Berkeley would deny that, strictly 
speaking, a physical object has an immanent causal structure – that there is ‘causality that 
works within [the] object over time’ in such a way that its later states are directly dependent 
on its earlier states [ibid.: 97]. However, this is a consequence of Berkeley’s ‘volitional’ 
conception of causality – according to which only minds can be causes [Principles 102 ff.] 
– rather than an implication of his idealist construal of physical objects as collections of 
ideas.24 Also, since Berkeley thinks it legitimate to ‘speak with the vulgar’ in ordinary 
causal discourse, rather than denying that fire heats, or that water cools [Principles 51], I 
assume that he would be willing – even given his volitional theory of causality – to say that 
a physical object’s later states do depend causally on its earlier states, as long as this is not 
literally interpreted.  
 Nor does it help Campbell’s case to insist that the causal unity and resulting identity 
conditions that he attributes to physical objects can be characterized without reference to 
minds, as in the following passage: 
 
When we characterize the identity of the object in this way [that is, in terms of the causal 
dependence of the way it is later on the way it was earlier], we do not need to bring in its 
relation to a mind. [2014: 29. Italics mine] 
 
                                                          




The most that would follow from this is that such identity conditions could be possessed by 
mind-independent objects, not that they could be possessed only by mind-independent 
objects. Hence, when Campbell concludes the passage I have quoted above with the 
sentence ‘That is how we have the conception of the object as mind-independent’ [ibid. 
Italics mine], this appears to be a non sequitur. How could our conception of an object as 
mind-independent be explained by our grasp of a property that could be possessed by mind-
independent objects, if that property could also be possessed by mind-dependent objects? 
To justify the inference, Campbell needs the additional premise that the identity conditions 
of mind-dependent objects (by which he evidently means the conditions for their sameness 
over time – their persistence conditions) essentially involve dependence on minds. 
Campbell does appear to hold that this is so: 
 
If an object is mind-dependent, if for example the object is constitutively dependent on 
your mind, or the mind of God, then the way things are later with that object depends on 
how things are then with your mind, or God’s . . . [ibid.: 97] 
 
However, as far as I can see, Campbell provides no argument for this crucial claim. And I 
see no reason to accept it. Yet without this claim, Campbell’s thesis that the sameness over 
time of a mind-dependent object (unlike a mind-independent object) cannot be constituted 
by ‘an immanent causal structure – the causality that works within an object over time’ 
[ibid.] is unsustained.25 
                                                          
25 Suppose that, in saying that a physical object’s ‘identity’ is constituted by such an internal causal 
structure, Campbell meant, by ‘its identity’, what makes it the object that it is, rather than (as I have 




 I conclude that Campbell has not provided a convincing argument that the properties 
that he regards as sufficient for the mind-independence of physical objects could not belong 
to physical objects construed, in Berkeleian fashion, as mind-dependent collections of ideas. 
 Turning to Cassam, our question is whether Berkeleian physical objects would lack any 
of the properties on Cassam’s list. Unfortunately for Cassam’s account, it looks as if the 
answer is ‘no’. Berkeleian physical objects surely have the properties of constancy and 
persistence. They have primary qualities such as shape and solidity (although Berkeley 
denies that there is an ontological distinction between such properties and so-called 
‘secondary qualities’ such as colour). And Berkeley does not deny that physical objects are 
located in space (see Walker [1985: 122–3]). Hence if, as Cassam suggests, it is sufficient 
for being a material object to have primary qualities such as shape, solidity, and location 
[2014: 163], then Berkeleian physical objects pass the test for being material objects too.26 
 At this point, I anticipate an objection. Perhaps Campbell and Cassam would protest that 
my argument for the inadequacy of their surrogate mind-independence properties depends 
on my interpreting those properties in an eccentric way. They might claim that on a proper 
interpretation of the nature of those properties, they could not belong to Berkeleian physical 
objects, and hence are genuinely sufficient for absolute mind-independence after all. 
However, this reply would only push the wrinkle in the carpet to another place. Campbell 
and Cassam would then face the task of establishing that it is the properties interpreted as 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that (as I have argued) such an internal causal structure could belong to physical objects even if they 
were mind-dependent collections of ideas. 
26 Berkeley denies that physical objects are material only because he does not take the properties 




they interpret them, rather than their Berkeleian counterparts, that show up in our perceptual 
experience. 
 My verdict is that it is doubtful that either Campbell or Cassam has identified properties 
that both are plausibly regarded as presented (or represented) in our perceptual experience, 
and also are plausibly sufficient for (absolute) mind-independence – that is, the 
independence of all minds that Berkeley denies to physical objects. If this is right, any 
defence, based on their discussion, of the claim that our ordinary perceptual experience 
seems to present the world to us as mind-independent in a way that would be misleading if 
Berkeleian idealism were true is very far from secure. 
 I conclude that Campbell and Cassam may be, so to speak, ‘Berkeleying up the wrong 
tree’. But this point extends beyond a criticism of Campbell and Cassam. My challenge to 
their project seems likely to confront any attempt to find, in our ordinary perceptual 
experience, the presentation (or representation) of properties that physical objects would not 
possess unless they were absolutely mind-independent, rather than being, as Berkeley 




I submit that the challenge posed to the AMI thesis by the rival Neutrality thesis (introduced 
in section 3 above) still stands. We have found no good reason to think that ordinary 
perceptual experience has the AMI property – the property of seeming to its subject to be 




to be suspicious of this claim. At the very least, we can conclude that the apparently 
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